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Abstract 
This paper explores the 2004 Kilwa massacre in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
through a decolonial perspective, explaining how the massacre is situated within the history 
of colonial power and global capitalist relations. As such, the convergence of mining and 
political interests that created the context in which this violence was possible is examined, 
rather than the specific human rights abuses committed during the massacre. This approach 
highlights how such acts of violence are an ongoing factor of colonial and postcolonial 
exploitation, as well as the difficulties in holding the responsible parties accountable. This 
investigation shows the importance of developing a decolonial Southern criminology that 
contextualizes human rights abuses within local and international systems of power and 
locates acts of criminal violence within the broader networks of structural violence. 
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The greatest evil is not … done in those sordid “dens of crime” that Dickens loved 
to paint. It is not done even in concentration camps and labour camps. 
 
In those we see its final result. But it is conceived and ordered … in clean, carpeted, 
warmed and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut 
fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their voice. (CS 
Lewis 1961: xxxvii) 
 
 
The Massacre 
In 2004, President Joseph Kabila gave an order for military action that led to the massacre of 
civilians in the mining town of Kilwa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Partially 
Australian-owned company, Anvil Mining (Anvil), helped to carry out this order by assisting the 
military. Kabila gave the order in response to a small number of insurgents who allegedly 
threatened the mine’s operations. A report compiled by Rights and Accountability in 
Development (2007) asserts that civilians who were not affiliated with the insurgents were 
rounded up by Kabila’s soldiers. They allege the soldiers detained, tortured, sexually abused and 
then executed up to 70 civilians. Investigations by various non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) allege interference by military personnel in their investigations, as well as a conflict of 
interest between the government and Anvil (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo 2005; Rights and Accountability in Development 2007; Global Witness 2011). 
 
On October 14 2004 at 2 am, 20-year-old Alain Kazadi (who claimed to be the leader of a rebel 
group) briefly occupied Kilwa with six or seven of his followers. The insurgents entered the local 
police station claiming they had the support of all military and politicians in the Katanga region 
and asked the police to join them. The Chief of Police and at least seven other officers allegedly 
joined the rebels (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2005: 3). The 
group then stole weapons from the local army base and accumulated another 40 members 
throughout the day. Kazadi held a public meeting in the town and announced Katanga’s 
independence, claiming that “the time for pocketing the money from the mines was over for 
President Kabila” (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2005: 4). After 
approaching Anvil’s fuel yard, Kazadi asked an Anvil employee to contact Anvil’s management. 
The UN’s (2005: 4) report states, “The insurgents insisted all the time they had not come to 
disturb the activities of the company.” The employee declined to negotiate and, by late morning, 
the insurgents were instructed to go home, have lunch, and then meet again in the afternoon. The 
UN report claims that, at this point, “an estimated 90% of the 48,000 inhabitants of Kilwa chose 
to flee” (2005: 4). Without any official radio announcements to confirm Kazadi’s claims, the 
fleeing inhabitants suspected a military response was imminent. During this time, Anvil closed 
operations and evacuated its staff via chartered planes. The mining company used the return 
flights to fly soldiers into Kilwa and sent Anvil trucks to Pweto (109 mi away) to collect soldiers. 
 
President Kabila ordered the town “re-captured” within 48 hours. The following day, Colonel 
Ademars led the 62nd brigade of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) 
in an attack on the town of Kilwa without offering any warning to its inhabitants. The FARDC 
bombarded Kilwa, demolishing several houses, before entering the town and engaging in a two-
hour firefight with the insurgents. No FARDC casualties were recorded. A report on the incident 
compiled by Rights and Accountability in Development (2011: 2) states: “Remaining civilians, 
mostly men and boys, were rounded up by soldiers and accused of supporting the rebels. Soldiers 
looted property and carried out other serious human rights violations including summary 
executions, sexual violence, torture, arbitrary detentions, pillage and extortion.” Reports vary, but 
it is estimated that up to 70 civilians were killed. 
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Anvil’s involvement in the Kilwa massacre was significant. The United Nations Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) allege that Anvil transported soldiers to 
Kilwa by road and air and supplied trucks to the army for their use during the attack (MONUC 
2005; Rights and Accountability in Development 2007; Global Witness 2011). Additionally, 
MONUC (2005) confirmed that three Anvil employees drove trucks during the attack. McBeth 
(2008: 134) concurs, stating: “Eyewitnesses reported that Anvil vehicles were used to transport 
looted goods, corpses, and detainees, some of whom were destined for execution.” MONUC (2005: 
8) confirmed that Anvil provided food to FARDC and “contributed to the payment of a certain 
number of soldiers.” Further, according to MONUC (2005), their investigation into the incident 
was marred by interference from the military. They allege General Alengbia delayed their mission 
by a day and sent military personnel ahead of them to warn the Kilwa residents not to cooperate 
with MONUC. Moreover, in trying to ascertain the number of victims presented to Kilwa hospital, 
MONUC was prevented from being given information. Notably, Colonel Ademars had arranged a 
meeting with hospital staff the day before MONUC’s arrival (United Nations Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo 2005: 6). During an interview on Four Corners, the president and 
CEO of Anvil, an Australian named William Turner, admitted that Katumba Mwanke (a close 
adviser of President Kabila) was on the board of directors of Anvil Mining. Anvil also admitted 
that Mwanke was paid to attend Anvil meetings and that Anvil’s headquarters were on property 
owned by Mwanke (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2005). This 
convergence of interests is highly significant and raises questions over accountability and legality 
regarding transnational mining companies such as Anvil. In the same interview, Turner 
responded to questions about his company’s involvement with FARDC and its subsequent supply 
of logistical support with ‘So what? So what?’ (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo 2005: 8). Semantics over legality of such actions are evidenced here by Turner, rather 
than ethical considerations.  
 
In 2005, the governor of Katanga invited the NGOs investigating the Kilwa incident to a meeting 
with Turner. In the presence of Turner, the governor told the NGOs that “they should defend the 
mining companies and not discourage investors” (Rights and Accountability in Development 
2007: 7). After Four Corners aired their investigation into the Kilwa incident, Colonel Ademar 
(who had recently been arrested on unrelated charges) was charged with war crimes and other 
offenses regarding the Kilwa invasion. Shortly after, in August 2005, Anvil produced a requisition 
order for logistical support for FARDC that was written to them from the then governor of 
Katanga. The letter was dated eight months after the incident (Rights and Accountability in 
Development 2007: 5–7). Significantly, this alleged requisition order was not mentioned in any 
investigations prior to Ademar’s arrest, nor did Turner mention it in his Four Corners interview. 
In 2006, a military trial was conducted in the DRC to investigate the massacre, resulting in the 
indictment of Colonel Ademar, eight other FARDC soldiers, Anvil, and three of Anvil’s employees 
(Rights and Accountability in Development 2007: 9). Crucially, Rights and Accountability in 
Development (2007: 9) note that “Only in the event of Anvil Mining employees being found guilty 
would Anvil Mining the company be liable.” The trial acquitted all involved. In its decision, the 
court referred to President Kabila’s order to re-take the town, and judged that “no summary 
executions had occurred in Kilwa, but that people had been killed during ‘fierce’ fighting between 
the rebels and the FARDC” (Rights and Accountability in Development 2007: 25). The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour stated: 
 
I am concerned at the court’s conclusions that the events in Kilwa were the 
accidental results of fighting, despite the presence at the trial of substantial eye-
witness testimony and material evidence pointing to the commission of serious 
and deliberate human rights violations. (Rights and Accountability in Development 
2007: 25; see also Global Witness 2011) 
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Arbour also expressed dismay about the use of a military court to try civilians. In this instance, it 
is apparent that the convergence of interests outlined earlier provided Anvil Mining and its 
employees with protection from prosecution. As head of the military, President Kabila’s orders 
provided legal protection to both the soldiers and Anvil employees involved in the massacre. 
 
A History of Colonial Violence 
 
A decolonial perspective requires that we place these events in social and historical context. 
Considering these contexts deters an uncritical western perspective that ignores atrocities in the 
Global South, which may result in a lack of empathy for those imagined as different and serve as 
a tacit explanation of these events (i.e., they were the inevitable outcome of intrinsically violent 
and corrupt cultures). Colonial notions of native savagery and the failed African state are not 
simply unhelpful, they are actively misleading. 
 
The collusion between violence and corporate interests has a long history in the Congo. Since the 
Congo’s colonization by Belgian King Leopold in the late nineteenth century, economic 
exploitation has been a trademark of the region. King Leopold’s methods of extracting materials 
from the Congo Free State (CFS) and its people endowed him with immense wealth. Military men 
acted as Leopold’s agents in the hunt for lucrative natural resources and the land and its people 
belonged to Leopold under the terms the local chiefs unwittingly signed. Hochschild (1998: 72) 
notes that the treaties “bought not just land, but manpower.” The pursuit of rubber caused the 
most heinous crimes perpetrated in the Congo—Congolese were kidnapped, raped, mutilated, 
and murdered (Morel 1904; Morel 1919). CFS agents often looted the villages, kidnapping women 
and holding them ransom until their husbands supplied the required amount of rubber (Anstey 
1966). A journal entry by a missionary in the CFS reported: “Each time the corporal goes out to 
get rubber, cartridges are given to him. He must bring back all not used; and for every one used, 
he must bring back a right hand … he informed me that in six months, they, the State, on the 
Momboyo River had used 6000 cartridges” (as cited in Anstey 1966: 7). Mr. E. Stannard provides 
a firsthand account of such atrocities in a letter included in Edmund Morel’s King Leopold’s Rule 
in Africa (1904). In the letter, Stannard recounts seeing severed hands and cannibalism (Morel 
1904: 444). Stannard witnessed the agents taking “prisoners and shooting, and killed 
Bongingangoa, his wife; Boali his little daughter of about five years of age” (Morel 1904: 444). By 
1908, a prolific and relentless campaign by the Congo Reform Association called attention to these 
atrocities. Consequently, the Belgian parliament held an inquiry into Leopold’s CFS (Louis and 
Stengers 1968) and the investigation was then passed on to the Belgian Government. The 
estimated death toll for this period - 1891 to 1908 - ranges from 6–8,000,000 lives (Hochschild 
1998: 3). 
 
The Belgian Congo (as the CFS was renamed) put an end to state-sanctioned terror. However, the 
state remained a colony with a ruthless legacy. The Congo’s primary purpose “was to develop ‘the 
economic action of Belgium’ ” (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 79). Accordingly, the Belgian Government 
contracted companies to build more infrastructure, offering them access to the natural resources 
of the Congo in return. Further, the Belgian Government developed a policy of recruiting tribal 
chiefs as their agents to ensure Congolese productivity remained high. Anstey (1966: 47) states, 
“The Chief was to be paid a salary … he was given explicit administration and police powers, and 
wider criminal jurisdiction in small matters as of right. The chief continued, of course, to be 
subject to European control and surveillance.” 
 
Decimated though they were by colonization, their history is not without resistance movements. 
Various indigenous uprisings and rebellions occurred from the beginning, but proved futile. 
Nonetheless, regular protests were held in the lead up to independence in 1960 (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2002: 82). By 1958, the thirst for independence had grown substantially and Patrice 
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Lumumba, Cyrille Adoula, and Joseph Ngalula formed the nation’s first political party, The 
Congolese National Movement (Anstey 1966). In May 1960, the Congolese held their first free 
elections and voted in Lumumba as Prime Minister. By June 1960, the Belgian King, Baudouin, 
officiated the nation’s independence from Belgian rule at the National Independence Ceremony. 
 
Lumumba’s commitment to political and economic freedom from Belgium threatened Western 
economic and military interests. Hickel (2017: 122) states, “The US feared Lumumba would 
loosen their grip on the Congo’s vast mineral resources, including the uranium they relied on for 
their nuclear program and the cobalt they needed for their jet engines.” Two months later, US 
President Eisenhower ordered Lumumba’s assassination (Hickel 2017: 121). Post-assassination, 
the US backed a coup in which Mobutu Sese Seko was installed as president, leading to decades 
of political tyranny that protected western economic interests. Mullins and Rothe (2008: 89) state 
that “In addition to looting his own country, Mobutu was infamous for extrajudicial executions, 
civilian massacres and a host of other crimes against humanity.” In 1997, the Congolese began to 
turn against Mobutu who were still not benefitting from the immense wealth being extracted 
from their land. His armed forces rebelled, and he quickly lost authority and was deposed from 
his presidency. Later that year, former guerilla chief turned gold and ivory trader, Laurent Kabila, 
announced himself as the Congo’s new president. In 2001, Kabila was assassinated by his 
bodyguard, Rachidi Kasareka (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 504). The following day, the late 
President’s son, Major-General Joseph Kabila, was announced as the new president of the DRC. 
He retained this position until 2019. 
 
There is a complex interplay of colonial violence within the specific events of the Kilwa massacre. 
Moreover, it is difficult to decide who is to be held responsible—the soldiers who committed the 
acts, the military commanders of the operation, the president who ordered military action, the 
Anvil employers who delivered soldiers to the scene, or the company bosses who instructed them 
to provide assistance to the military. Further, should the underlying social and historical 
conditions, the deliberate creation of a corrupt and underdeveloped state, and the willful 
collusion of international business interests and this government be examined? It is important to 
avoid both the tendency to only see violence as criminal acts of individual aggressors and the risk 
of erasing notions of agency and responsibility by focusing only on structural inevitability. 
 
An Exemplary Australian 
 
William Turner is not only a specific powerful decisionmaker, but also a symbolic representative 
of the way in which Western business interests play out in the developing world and how these 
interests are represented in the business’ home country. Since Anvil’s acquittal in the DRC, Turner 
is yet to face any sanction for his involvement in the massacre. On the contrary, he was awarded 
an Order of Australia (AO) in 2016. Bestowed on Australia’s best and brightest, the AO is a 
prestigious honor. Turner received this illustrious award for “distinguished service to the mining 
sector and international relations through leadership in business and exploration between 
Australia and Africa” (Cosgrove 2016). Though he is now retired from his CEO position, Turner 
remains a powerful player in the mining sector. He is chairman of Geo40 Limited, which “will be 
the first company to commercialise, in large scale, the extraction of silica from geothermal fluids” 
(Geo40 Limited 2020). Until late 2019, Turner also served as director of Australia–Africa Minerals 
and Energy Group (AAMEG), a “peak body representing Australian companies engaged in the 
development of Africa’s resource industry” (AAMEG 2019). While grappling with the conundrum 
of corporate crime and individual morality, Hills (1987: 190) states: “How is it possible that 
people who are basically moral and decent in their own families—perhaps even generous in civic 
and charitable contributions—are able to engage in corporate acts that have extraordinarily 
inhumane consequences?” More specifically, how do we reconcile the two versions of Turner we 
are presented with: law-abiding, celebrated mining executive in Australia and an alleged 
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facilitator of human rights atrocities in the DRC? Turner was not accused of deliberately plotting 
human rights abuses; however, he played a key role in maintaining a corrupt relationship 
between Anvil and the Kabila regime to ensure the company’s interests were politically protected. 
Further, Turner provided logistical support for military actions against citizens, which might 
reasonably have been predicted to carry the risk of human rights atrocities. 
 
The notion of the “banality of evil” was explored by philosopher Hannah Arendt in her book 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1994). Arendt attempts to understand the 
role of high-ranking German Nazi officer Adolf Eichmann during the holocaust. Eichmann’s job 
was to “organise the transportation of Jews from around Europe to extermination camps” 
(Morton 2004: 80). Post WWII, Eichmann was kidnapped from a hideout in Argentina and put on 
trial in Jerusalem. He was charged with being a principal orchestrater of the holocaust, thus 
becoming the face of unimaginable evil. Arendt, herself Jewish, attended the trial and, 
controversially at the time, theorized that Eichmann was not inherently evil or harboring hateful 
motives, but that his faithful adherence to orders resulted in evil acts. Regarding Eichmann’s 
motives, Arendt (1994: 287) states, “Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his 
personal advancement, he had no motives at all. And this diligence was, in itself, in no way 
criminal; he certainly would never have murdered his superior in order to inherit his post. He 
merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realised what he was doing.” Further, Morton (2004: 
80) concurs that an “exaggerated sense of duty and obedience” motivated Eichmann, rather than 
any sadistic intent. In Arendt’s account, Eichmann was simply a morally vacuous bureaucrat who 
ensured the trains ran on time with no thought of the consequences of the logistical infrastructure 
he managed. 
 
For Arendt, the distinction between evil intent and evil acts is central to her theory on the banality 
of evil. She contends that evil acts perpetrated as a result of banal thoughtlessness are no less evil 
than crimes perpetrated with evil intent. Hence, though Eichmann’s actions came from a banal 
desire to follow orders and be a good officer, they were evil. Arendt (1994: 288) states “that such 
remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc than all evil instincts 
taken together which, perhaps, are inherent in man—that was, in fact, the lesson one could learn 
in Jerusalem.” Moreover, as Eichmann was obeying the orders of his government, his crimes were 
legal, which further complicates our understanding of evil. While the average person may 
understand the holocaust as evil, at the same time it is difficult to comprehend the legal and 
systematic structure that was required to carry out this genocide. Indeed, during an Australian 
Broadcasting Company interview regarding his role in the Kilwa massacre, Turner defended 
himself: “This was a military action conducted by the legitimate army of the legitimate 
government of the country” (Nolan 2005). Like Eichmann, Turner revealed no evil intent toward 
the victims of the massacre—he simply regarded supporting the military actions of a repressive 
government to ensure an ostensibly corrupt convergence of interests as his business because it 
is a rational business strategy. However, in some sense, this action is evil. 
 
Concerning Eichmann’s trial, Arendt (1994: 289) states, “In its judgement the court naturally 
conceded that such a crime could be committed only by a giant bureaucracy using the resource 
of government.” Eichmann himself seemed confused that he should be considered evil and 
protested throughout the trial that he was simply following orders and doing his job. Arendt 
(1994: 293) argues, “Eichmann acted fully within the framework of the kind of judgement 
required of him: he acted in accordance with the rule, examined the order issued to him for its 
legality.” As such, the court in Jerusalem found itself in unprecedented legal territory: how can a 
court try a man for “legal” crimes that were ordered and directed by a legal government? Here, 
an important distinction between morality and legality must be made, revealing how difficult it 
is to legally apportion guilt for administrative genocides (or legal massacres). In this regard, the 
law is inadequate for handling the trial of an atrocity enabled by lawful orders. 
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Literary masterpiece Heart of Darkness is based largely on Joseph Conrad’s (2007) experience in 
the Congo and wrestles with similar themes. The book’s protagonist, Mr. Kurtz, is described as 
“the mysterious figure whose moral compass has apparently gone haywire” (Butcher; as cited in 
Conrad 2007: xiv); he represents key colonial pioneers in the Congo. For Conrad, the lack of 
accountability inherent in the colonization of the Congo region exposed the inhabitants to 
extreme corruption and abuse of power. A central theme emerges for Arendt and Conrad alike: 
the capacity for evil is within us all. Arendt’s shock at discovering that Eichmann was not 
pathologically sadistic, but ordinary, dull, and banal, led her to theorize that he (and evil itself) 
could not be “othered.” Given the same conditions, anyone could become an “Eichmann” by 
fulfilling their socially prescribed role without any critical reflection on its consequences. 
Similarly, Turner is an individual thoughtlessly acting out the destructive interests of a greater 
social system and an unreflective embodiment of the violence in the processes he directs. 
 
Impersonal and bureaucratic in nature, transnational corporations (TNCs) and the crimes 
associated with them can be conceptualized through Arendt’s (1994) banality of evil theory. As 
she outlines, it is the dehumanizing process of bureaucracy that enables ordinary people to 
commit unethical acts without ever having to consult their conscience; thus, making state and 
corporate crimes ethically ambiguous. Moreover, the relationship between capitalism and the law 
further complicates the issue. In Australia, consumers are purportedly protected by Australian 
Consumer Law, which requires businesses to, “report deaths, serious injuries or illnesses 
associated with consumer goods. This requirement is known as ‘mandatory reporting’. All 
participants in the supply chain of a consumer goods or a product-related service are required to 
comply with the reporting requirements” (2018). Further, failure to report the above can result 
in corporate criminal convictions and a fine of up to A$1.1 million (Australian Consumer Law 
2018). However, the advance of globalization has allowed Western companies to conduct much 
of their business practice in vulnerable developing countries that are beyond the reach of these 
legal regulations. Under neoliberal globalization, nation-states’ ability to hold corporations 
accountable for their international actions is diminished. Box (1983; see also Hills 1987) argues 
that fines provide little incentive for corporations to act ethically. Hills (1987: 201) contends that 
fines are dealt with by TNCs as an “overhead business expense.” Illustrating this, a 1978 court 
case against Ford Motor Company in the US revealed that the manufacturing of a fuel tank Ford 
knew to be faulty was predicated on “a cost-benefit analysis” (Swigert and Farrell 1981: 166). 
Swigert and Farrell argue, “Officials at Ford allegedly predicted the number of severe burn 
injuries and deaths that would result from the defect and estimated that the cost of repairing the 
car would exceed anticipated court settlement” (1981: 166). Therefore, the ease with which 
corporations circumvent the economic cost of fines ultimately renders fining redundant. 
 
Internal corporation structures and cultures that influence employee decision-making are crucial 
in understanding corporate crime. Hills (1987: 191) posits that “the internal organisational 
climate—the corporate subculture—is not typically an environment suffused with ethical 
sensibilities and discussions of social responsibility. Instead, quantifiable performance criteria 
based on production goals … pervade the corporate atmosphere.” Corporate players are 
rewarded for being singularly effective at generating profits and, like Eichmann, for following the 
orders of their superiors. Moreover, they are effectively socialized to avoid dwelling on the 
potentially disruptive moral ramifications of these actions. In the competitive market-driven 
environment of corporations, employees who display “moral flexibility” (Box 1983: 39) are 
rewarded with promotions and the comfort of financial stability (or an AO, as in Turner’s case). 
Box (1983: 39) argues, “Not only does the promotion system mean that people who rise to the 
top are likely to have just those personal characteristics it takes to commit corporate crime, but 
these are also reinforced by the psychological consequences of success itself, for these … free a 
person from the moral bind of conventional values.” Further, the higher up the chain executives 
go, the more power they wield. Box (1983: 41) states, “moral flexibility will experience a further 
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development when they have to respond to the relatively unaccountable and unconstrained 
power of being at … the top.” Such unrestricted power requires the individual to rely, almost 
exclusively, on their moral code. Yet, as elucidated above, those operating at the upper echelons 
of corporate power have already displayed a predisposition for “moral flexibility.” Consequently, 
the global systems of exploitation and violence both produce and reward the types of individuals 
who ensure those systems achieve their goals. 
 
Exemplifying a model corporate citizen, William Turner’s efficient commitment to profit as 
Anvil’s CEO evokes Lewis’ (1961) softly spoken, “smooth-shaven” evil doer and Arendt’s 
indifferent evil doer. Further, a legal court was inadequate to prosecute the state crimes ordered 
by former President Kabila and perpetrated through his armed forces (who were aided by Anvil 
Mining) because the crimes were ordered by a legal government. The court’s reference to the 
president’s order to capture the town during its decision to acquit all involved requires critical 
scrutiny. Having established that banal indifference can and does result in evil and atrocious acts, 
regardless of intent, and that legality is not synonymous with morality, the notion of corporate 
actors’ agency is important. 
 
Whether corporate employees are able to object or refuse to comply with directives they consider 
immoral must also be examined. Regarding the culture of organizations and their role in 
corporate crime, Mullins and Rothe (2008: 88) state, “it must be acknowledged that the 
perpetrators and decision makers in these cases possess agency. They are not automatons blindly 
responding to socio-political forces, but rather, lively social actors who often wield large amounts 
of social power and institutional authority.” As such, those actors implicated in corporate crime 
can be understood as releasing themselves from the responsibility to critically reflect on 
potentially harmful consequences of their decisions; thus, choosing to abandon their humanity 
for the banal desire of career advancement. The challenge here is to understand both the 
conditions that produce these corporate actors and the consequences of their chosen actions. To 
overcome this challenge, it is crucial to consider the context of meaning in which their societies 
make sense of them and they make sense of themselves. 
 
This analysis revealed that corporate conduit William Turner was richly rewarded for 
abandoning his conscience. He reached the top of the corporate chain and received the economic 
benefits and prestige of that position. Further, the Australian Government bestowed on him its 
highest honor—the AO. He is recognized as both a consummate corporate player and an 
exemplary Australian citizen. As Turner received an AO after the events at Kilwa, one could 
conclude that the Australian Government is willing to actively avert recognition of violence in the 
service of economic exploitation, which is rather more comfortably framed as “distinguished 
service to the mining sector and international relations” (Cosgrove 2016). From a decolonial 
perspective, it could be argued that Australia is implicated in and continues the legacy of the state-
corporate exploitation in the Congo that was established by King Leopold and perpetuated by his 
successors. 
 
Global Profits, Global Violence 
 
According to Karl Marx (1992), exploitation is an inherent feature of wealth creation in a capitalist 
system. A rudimentary understanding of Marx’s theory is that capitalism requires the exploitation 
of natural resources and people’s labor, which is necessary to generate profit. Further, low labor 
and production costs are essential in the creation and exchange of commodities. As such, 
capitalism’s constant need to drive down production costs to increase profits is the engine of this 
exploitation. Expanding on Marx’s theory, Garry Leech (2012) theorizes that capitalism has its 
own internal logic and this logic serves the interests of those in positions of power. Leech (2012: 
26) argues, “according to the logic of capital, society exists to serve the economy, rather than the 
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reverse.” Therefore, the production of profits and capital accumulation take precedence over 
human well-being. 
 
Historically, the benefactors and stakeholders of a free market economy have influenced 
governments to intervene on their behalf. Proponents of free market capitalism, such as Milton 
Friedman (2002: 2), assert that the role of government in a market-based economy is to “preserve 
law and order, to enforce private contracts and to foster competitive markets.” Further, Friedman 
(2002: 4) argues that democracy itself cannot exist in the absence of a free market economy. To 
this end, the “rule of law” plays a crucial role in prioritizing the interests of capital in a liberal 
democratic system. As such, Leech (2012: 25) argues that the market and the rule of law are 
inextricably linked within Western capitalist democracies. 
 
Central to capitalism’s growth and, therefore, Western dominance, is capitalism’s genesis in 
colonialism. Vandana Shiva (2005: 19) argues that the “Key to the domination of the market 
economy is its ability to claim resources from outside its scope.” As reflected in the history of the 
Congo, colonialism’s legacy is one of exploitation and plunder: first of people, then of raw 
materials. Moreover, Anthony Anghie (2004; see also Grovogui 1996; Koskenniemi 2001) argues 
that colonialism was legitimized and facilitated by international law and created specifically for 
the needs of colonizers. In particular, the period between 1890 and 1914 is associated with the 
greatest profits for colonizers. This was the time of Leopold’s reign in the Congo—a time of 
unprecedented suffering that culminated in the genocide of millions (Hochschild 1998). 
 
Simultaneously, a combination of pervasive racism and Christian ideology provided a convenient 
backdrop for colonial rhetoric. Decolonial theorist Samir Amin (2011: 106) states that “The 
dominant discourse of the time praised colonisation (its civilising mission) and described 
globalisation as synonymous with peace.” This very tactic was employed with aplomb by King 
Leopold during his campaign for the Congo and his subsequent rule (Hochschild 1998: 42). 
Leopold’s “humanitarian” mission to the Congo was, in reality, the pursuit of his own personal 
fiefdom and the antithesis of a humanitarian mission. Similarly, contemporary TNCs praise 
themselves for job creation and economic development, ignoring the violent consequences of 
deliberately operating in areas that allow them to ruthlessly exploit labor and the environment, 
and often actively support the political powers that prevent protections against these abuses and 
use violence against their own citizens to advance the interests of those corporations. 
 
By the 1950s, independence movements in the Congo and across the globe presented a threat to 
European and US corporate interests. Western governments, in particular the US, toppled 
governments, orchestrated coups, and installed leaders sympathetic to their interests to continue 
exploiting postcolonial states (Hickel 2017). By the 1970s and 1980s, the Western zeitgeist had 
developed a moral sensitivity and awareness of human rights issues; thus, explicit neocolonial 
violence was less acceptable. Consequently, another ideological discourse was required to allow 
the continued plundering of postcolonial states (i.e., development aid). Henry Kissinger, then US 
Secretary of State, used the United Nations to influence postcolonial member states to vote in the 
interest of Western states in exchange for aid (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Crucially, this aid was 
attached to conditions that required recipient nations to be organized around transnational 
economic interests rather than the interests of their citizens. Further, these conditions required 
redirecting revenue away from nation-building public services and toward debt repayment—
preventing these nations from developing (Hickel 2017: 154; Klein 2007; Leech 2012). 
 
The concept of structural violence provides a useful framework for understanding how the logic 
of economic exploitation historically guided imperialism. Developed to analyze social injustice 
and inequality, Johan Galtung’s (1969) theory of structural violence aims to understand how 
structures within institutions, businesses, governments, and the like, cause intentional and 
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unintentional suffering systematically and indirectly. Violence was and is an essential tool for 
imperialism and colonial exploitation. If capitalism cannot exist without exploitation, then it 
cannot exist without violence. 
 
Typically, violence is understood as the threat or use of direct physical force by an individual or 
group against another individual or group. However, according to Galtung (1969), structural 
violence occurs when society is organized in a way that prevents groups of people from meeting 
their basic needs and causes them harm through adverse life outcomes. The important conceptual 
distinction is between the traditional definition of direct violence (i.e., a malicious agent threatens 
or harms a victim with physical force) and the less visible systemic forms of harm: poverty, 
insecurity, lack of basic human rights and freedoms, and the absence of the social conditions for 
good health and well-being. Structural violence is not always deliberately orchestrated in a 
malicious way, but often simply serves the interests of the privileged at the expense of the 
marginalized. 
 
Importantly, while instances of direct violence can be attributed to an individual or group, which 
enables prosecution, structural violence is more difficult to attribute to specific perpetrators and 
thus harder to conceptualize within a criminal justice framework. Galtung (1969: 170) argues, 
“ethical systems directed against intended violence will easily fail to capture structural violence 
in their nets—and may hence be catching the small fry and letting the big fish loose.” 
 
Galtung (1969: 179) advances the idea that structural violence is the direct result of systems 
established to benefit “those who are at the top.” As such, it is in the interest of those in power 
and the beneficiaries of said systems to maintain the status quo. Insidiously, those in positions of 
power have various armed forces at their disposal to quell any threat to the status quo. Therefore, 
maintenance of structural violence is often supported by direct violence when the system and its 
beneficiaries are threatened. Galtung (1969: 179) argues: 
 
one has to observe carefully, for the most interested in the maintenance of the 
status quo may not come openly to the defence of the structure: they may push 
their mercenaries in front of them … and remain themselves in more discrete, 
remote seclusion from the turmoil of personal violence. 
 
This pattern has been highlighted repeatedly in the history of the Congo; from its inception, 
powerful elites have used various militias at their disposal to uphold their structurally violent 
regimes. King Leopold remained a continent away from the maiming and mutilating tactics his 
regime used to enforce his structurally violent colonial venture. To maintain control over the 
Congo’s natural resources post-independence, US President Eisenhower ordered Prime Minster 
Lumumba’s assassination from the “seclusion” of the white house, while his mercenaries on the 
ground engaged in the “turmoil” of direct violence. Hickel (2017: 122) states that “Lumumba was 
shot, chopped to pieces and burned to ashes in a barrel.” More recently, President Mobuto and 
President Kabila have been accused of using their armed forces to terrorize, intimidate, and 
massacre their own people in their pursuit of personal wealth (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Young 
and Turner 1985; McBeth 2008). The violent removal of the democratic government and the 
general state of underdevelopment and poor social infrastructure serve to ensure that Western 
interest continues to have access to cheap mineral resources at the minor cost of supporting 
compliant political tyrants. Kabila and Turner’s alleged collusion regarding Anvil’s assets in Kilwa 
continues this trend. 
 
As a victim of structural and direct violence for over a century, the DRC has been crippled by 
imperialism. It currently has one of the worst Human Development Index rankings in the world—
14 from the bottom of 189 countries that are ranked regarding “long and healthy life, being 
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knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living” (United Nations Development Programme 
2018). During the genocide caused by Leopold’s colonial endeavors and Mobutu’s brutal 
dictatorship, the DRC endured crimes against humanity, violence, and state-sanctioned terror. 
More recently, years of civil war and the government’s inability to control militia groups has made 
the DRC one of the most dangerous places on earth. Though economically destitute, the nation is 
still rich in highly desired natural resources (Mullins and Rothe 2008: 91). Mullins and Rothe 
(2008: 96) state, “For transnational corporations, profitability is often the core driver of their 
actions in global systems. Politically and economically disorganised nations provide fertile 
grounds for asset enhancement.” 
 
The DRC’s long history as a source of wealth for imperialist nations made it an attractive location 
for Anvil. Further, the application of violence via the DRC’s armed forces and the DRC’s alleged 
collusion with Anvil continues a long history of violence by colonial regimes for imperialist wealth 
creation. Understanding the way in which the capitalist organization of society serves the 
creation of profits rather than the interests of citizens aids understanding of Anvil’s involvement 
at Kilwa. Under such principles, Anvil was required to protect its profit margins and, in the geo-
political context of the DRC, this structurally violent premise was expressed in a directly deadly 
manner that resulted in the death of over 70 civilians. 
 
It is the contention here that William Turner receiving an AO after the events at Kilwa is not an 
anomaly or an oversight. Rather, the Australian Government, itself a legal bureaucracy, has 
enshrined the structurally violent logic of capitalism in law and rewarded Turner for his 
consummate efforts in wealth creation via neocolonial exploitation and violence. These actions 
are part of a long historical tendency to discount and misrepresent the violence of Western 
interests in developing countries, resulting in the failure to effectively prosecute this violence 
within a legal framework or even imagining it as a problem within international relations. 
 
The typical notion of violence is exemplified in the Kilwa massacre, but it is crucial to recognize 
how TNCs actively support the poor social and legal infrastructure in places like the DRC and 
collude with corrupt and undemocratic governments. This allows TNCs to generate profits that 
would be impossible in countries with strong labor, environmental, and human rights 
protections. TNCs do not simply use these vulnerable spaces as opportunities for profiteering, but 
actively support the political regimes that deny these protections to their citizens. They utilize 
corrupt convergences of interest such as those illustrated through Katumba Mwanke—the 
personal adviser to president Kaliba who was given a position on the board of directors of Anvil. 
What needs to be addressed here is the deliberate entanglement of the economic interests of 
Kaliba’s inner circle with those of the mining company, as well as Anvil’s material support for the 
Kaliba Government’s human rights abuses, which was revealed through the logistical support for 
the soldiers committing the massacre. 
 
A study that only examined the technical legality of Anvil’s role in the Congo was inadequate, as 
was the court in which the matter of the Kilwa Massacre was heard. What is needed is a Southern 
criminology (Carrington et al. 2018) that positions the massacre within global history and 
relations of power. It is crucial to examine specific issues of criminal justice in the Global South 
with an understanding of the international context in which they occur. Moreover, it should not 
simply be a Southern criminology, but a decolonial criminology. In this case, that means 
understanding this massacre within the long history of violent invasion and exploitation that was 
started by King Leopold and continued in the neocolonial violence of the assassination of Prime 
Minster Lumumba, the support of the dictator Mobutu, and the corrupt regime of Joseph Kabila. 
Notably, it is often no longer necessary for Western powers to send in overt military forces to 
achieve their economic goals. It is more convenient to support and collaborate with corrupt and 
repressive regimes within those vulnerable countries and create dependency through debt to 
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force developing countries to adopt policies that favor the profits of international businesses over 
the well-being of their own citizens. Further, the most serious forms of harm are not necessarily 
the dramatic instances of human rights abuses witnessed in this massacre, but the pervasive 
social suffering of those on the receiving end of these forms of transnational exploitation—the 
individuals working in dangerous and underpaid conditions and lacking the basic material 
conditions for quality of life: education, medical welfare, safety, and social and political autonomy. 
The harms of this structural violence add to and far exceed the direct violence of invasion and 
political repression. 
 
TNCs do not simply take advantage of these conditions and the cheap labor and natural resources 
they create, but they actively support them. As revealed through William Turner, while claiming 
to do the good work of job creation and economic development, TNCs receive accolades from the 
neocolonial centers of power to which they return their profits, rather than being held 
accountable for the structural violence that their “business as usual” entails. As such, a critical 
Southern criminology must also be a decolonial criminology of the West and the structural 
violence of its exploitation of vulnerable societies within normalized practices of transnational 
business endeavors. 
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